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NOTES
RULE 8-04(b)(2) OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: A STEP TOO FAR?
INTRODUCTION
The recent promulgation of proposed Federal Rules of Evidence is a
result of a continuous movement in the United States toward reform of
the law of evidence.' A major target of this reform is the hearsay rule.
Because of its multifarious exceptions, the hearsay rule has become both
confusing and difficult to apply.' Attempts to abandon the rule entirely,
or in the alternative to liberalize its exceptions,' have enveloped the
reform movement in controversy.4 Article VIII, Hearsay, of the pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence has been proffered as a reasonable
measure of reform of the hearsay rule.' The draftsmen of the Federal
Rules of Evidence have retained the rule against hearsay, but have
systematically revised its exceptions.' The purpose of this note is to
discuss whether rule 8-04(b) (2), Statement of Recent Perception, is a
reasonable exception to the rule against hearsay. Consideration will be
given not only to past experience but also to the present judicial applica-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7
1. The most notable achievements are the Model Code of Evidence, adopted and
promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1942; the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1953,
approved by the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute, adopted in
California, Kansas and New Jersey; and the latest effort, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
proposed in 1969.
2. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 230-99 (1954) for an elaboration of the various
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
3. See generally the "standard of reliability" and "predictability of result" argu-
ments of T. Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the Docket Crisis: The Futile Search for
Paradise, 54 A.B.A.J. 231 (1968), and F. Booker & R. Morton, The Hearsay Rule, the
St. George Plays and the Road to the Year Twenty-fifty, 44 NoTRE DAME LAw. 7 (1968).
4. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, ch. VI; UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, art.
VIII.
5. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, Introductory Note, 46 F.R.D. 324, 328 (Prelim. Draft
1969):
This plan is submitted as calculated to encourage growth and development in this
area of the law, while conserving the values and experience of the past as a
guide to the future.
Id.
6. Id. at 327.
7. Only the applicability of federal rule 8-04(b) (2) in civil cases will be discussed.
The rule, however, is applicable to criminal cases as well.
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WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE?
The hearsay rule protects the litigant from the risks of inaccuracy
and untrustworthiness inherent in the untested statement of an out-of-
court declarant.8 Rule 8-02 of the Federal Rules continues this pro-
tection :' "Hearsay 0 is inadmissible except as provided by these rules or
the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure or by Act of Congress."'" It
may be undesirable to exclude hearsay evidence where it is clear that the
statement is free from the risks of inaccuracy or untrustworthiness." In
such an instance an exception to the rule is needed. Two considerations, a
circumstantial probability of trustworthiness and a necessity for the
evidence, are the foundation of exceptions to the hearsay rule.'
There are two categorical exceptions to rule 8-02: 1) rule 8-03 (a),"
relating to conditions which indicate that unavailability of the declarant
has no bearing on the admissibility of the out-of-court statement; and 2)
rule 8-04 (a), relating to conditions which indicate that the declarant's
8. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 224 (1954). Hearsay statements are untested in that
they are not subject to cross-examination. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed.
1940) ; see also NLRB v. Imparto Stevedoring Corp., 250 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Col-
grove v. Goodyear, 325 Mich. 127, 37 N.W.2d 779 (1949) ; Dempsey v. Meighen, 251
Minn. 562, 90 N.W.2d 178 (1958).
9. FED. R. EvID. art. VIII, Introductory Note, 46 F.R.D. 324 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
10. FED. R. EviD. 8-01(c), 46 F.R.D. 331 (Prelim. Draft 1969) :
"Hearsay" is a statement, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, unless (1) . . . The statement is one made by a witness while testify-
ing at the trial or hearing; or (2) . . . The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is (i) inconsistent with his testimony, or (ii) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (iii) one of identification
of a person made soon after perceiving him, or (iv) a transcript of testimony
given under oath at a trial or hearing or before a grand jury; or (3) . . . The
statement is offered against a party and is (i) his own statement, in either his
individual or a representative capacity, or (ii) a statement of which he has mani-
fested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (iii) a statement by a person author-
ized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (iv) a statement by
his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or em-
ployment, made before the termination of the relationship, or (v) a statement
by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.
Compare MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 225, at 460 (1954):
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made
out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of
matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of
the out-of-court asserter.
Id.
11. FED. R. EVID. 8-02, 46 F.R.D. 343 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
12. 5 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940).
13. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961) ; Olesen v. Henningsen, 247 Iowa 883, 77 N.W.2d 40 (1956) ; Fauceglia v. Harry,
409 Pa. 155, 185 A.2d 598 (1962).
14. FED. R. EVID. 8-03(a), 46 F.R.D. 345 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
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unavailability is a condition precedent to the admissibility of his state-
ment. 5 Traditional hearsay exceptions were used as a basis for formulat-
ing the exceptions listed under rules 8-03(a) and 8-04(a). These
exceptions illustrate, but do not limit, the applicability of the two rules.'"
Rule 8-04(a) provides:
A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature
and special circumstances under which it was made offer strong
assurances of accuracy and the declarant is unavailable as a
witness. 7
The subject of this note is rule 8-04(b) (2), an illustration of rule
8-04 (a), which excepts from the hearsay rule
[a] statement, not in response to the instigation of a person
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates,
describes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived
by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of
pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and
while his recollection was clear.'"
This rule is not a codification of a common law exception. 9 It is a
relaxation of the strict requirements of hearsay exceptions. The problem
is whether 8-04(b)(2) merits adoption as an illustration of hearsay
statements whose admission is desirable.
THE ELEMENT OF NECESSITY
An essential element for admissibility of hearsay evidence is the
need to receive it.2" The evidence may be necessary because of the
death,2 ' insanity,22 absence from the jurisdiction23 or other unavailability
of the declarant.2 4 Evidence may also be necessary where conditions
15. Id. 8-04(a) at 377.
16. Id. art. VIII, Introductory Note at 324.
17. Id. 8-04(a) at 377.
18. Id. 8-04(b) (2).
19. Id. Committee Note at 382.
20. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961) ; United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Horton v. Nichols,
117 Ga. App. 748, 162 S.E.2d 208 (1968) ; Moore v. Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc., 105 Ga.
App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961) ; Chillstrom v. Trojan Seed Co., 242 Minn. 471, 65
N.W.2d 888 (1954) ; King v. Johnson Bros. Constr. Co., 155 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1967).
21. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65 (1956); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-11
(1957).
22. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d)(3) (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-286 (1950).
See the proposal of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence of the
American Bar Association in 63 A.B.A. REP. 570, 584 (1938).
23. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d) (3) (1963).
24. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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indicate that the court cannot be expected at this or any other time to get
evidence of the same value from the same or other sources.2" The
committee note indicates that rule 8-04(a) is based, in part, on neces-
sity.26 Under this rule, the declarant" must be unavailable28 if his
statement" is to be admitted. ° It is doubtful whether unavailability alone
can be a sufficient basis for an exception to the hearsay rule." Courts
have, however, admitted hearsay statements where there was some urgent
need for the evidence other than the declarant's unavailability. 2
In Moore v. Atlanta Transit System,"2 for example, the statement
of a deceased declarant describing how she was injured was admitted into
evidence because there were no other witnesses to the accident.2" The
25. Necessity in this context requires a comparison of the probative value of
the survey with the evidence, if any, which as a practical matter could be used
if the survey were excluded. If the survey is more valuable, then necessity
exists for the survey, i.e., it is the inability to get "evidence of the same value"
which makes the hearsay statement necessary.
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also
United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
There is a need for hearsay evidence where it is apparent that more satisfactory
evidence is not available. See Olesen v. Henningsen, 247 Iowa 883, 77 N.W.2d 40
(1956); Chillstrom v. Trojan Seed Co., 242 Minn. 471, 65 N.W.2d 888 (1954).
A necessity for hearsay evidence also arises where evidence is available from no
other source. See Horton v. Nichols, 117 Ga. App. 748, 162 S.E.2d 208 (1968) ; Moore
v. Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc., 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961).
26. FED. R. EvID. 8-04(a), Committee Note, 46 F.R.D. 377, 378 (Prelim. Draft
1969).
27. "A declarant is a person who makes a statement" FED. R. EvID. 8-01 (b), 46
F.R.D. 331 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
28. "Unavailable as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant is:
(1) Exempted by ruling of the judge on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or (2) Persistent in refusing to
testify despite an order of the judge to do so; or (3) Unable to be present or to
testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness
or infirmity; or (4) Absent from the hearing and beyond the jurisdiction of the
court to compel appearance and the proponent of his statement has exercised
reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his attendance.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, in-
ability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of
his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.
FED. R. EvID. 8-01(d), 46 F.R.D. 332 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
29. "A statement is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) a nonverbal conduct of
a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion." FED. R. EVID. 8-01 (a), 46 F.R.D. 331
(Prelim. Draft 1969).
30. FED. R. EvID. 8-04(a), 46 F.R.D. 377 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
31. Rule 503(a) of the Model Code of Evidence provided broadly for admission of
any hearsay declaration of an unavailable declarant. No circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness were required. Lacking in precedent, the rule met with little success.
FED. R. Evn. 8-04(b) (2), Committee Note, 46 F.R.D. 377, 383 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
32. Moore v. Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc., 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961);
Jacobs v. Village of Buhl, 199 Minn. 572, 273 N.W. 245 (1937).
33. 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961).
34. The court ruled:
[D]eclarations of a decedent, or where there is equivalent unavailability of the
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 5
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statement was not made until eighteen months after the accident and six
months before the trial. At that time it was made to a doctor who
examined her on behalf of the defendant transit system. Reliability was
not an issue.85 The court admitted the evidence because of the peculiar
need for it-the non-existence of any other eye-witnesses to the accident.
In another case that considered the question, Jacobs v. Village of
Buhl," the court admitted a non-spontaneous 7 statement that a police-
man had made forty-five minutes after an accident. The statement
described how the policeman had injured his knee in a fall while he was
alone on his beat. He died several months later from septecemia. The
evidence was accepted out of necessity -not because the policeman was
dead, but because he had been working alone and lacked the benefit of a
witness to his accident.
A Connecticut statute"' provides for admission of statements of a
deceased declarant in actions by or against his personal representative.
This provision is necessary to offset the presumed inequality resulting
when a surviving opponent is allowed to testify about matters concerning
the decedent's estate."9 Accordingly, the court in Plisko v. Morgan"
admitted the statement of a deceased declarant that attributed his accident
declarant, to whomsoever made are admissible in evidence if there are no other
witnesses to alleged occurrence. "Other witnesses" within the meaning of this rule
would include eyewitnesses, whether favorable or unfavorable to the party offer-
ing the evidence, but would exclude those who merely testify that they did not
see the alleged occurrence.
Moore v. Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc., 105 Ga. App. 70, 84, 123 S.E.2d 693, 701 (1961).
See also Horton v. Nichols, 117 Ga. App. 748, 162 S.E.2d 208 (1968) ; Comm'rs of Rds.
and Revenue v. Davis, 107 Ga. App. 647, 131 S.E.2d 144 (1963).
35. The court quoted Atlanta St. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 93 Ga. 462, 465, 21 S.E. 48, 49
(1893), in which Chief Judge Bleckley stated "[S]carcely anything * * * [is] less re-
liable than a sick plaintiff's opinion of his own case, when he is in pursuit of damages."
Moore v. Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc., 105 Ga. App. 70, 84, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961).
36. 199 Minn. 572, 273 N.W. 245 (1937).
37. Spontaneity is the key to res gestae cases. A non-spontaneous statement could
not be admitted as part of the res gestae. 6 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1749 (3d ed. 1940).
See also Showalter v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 460, 106 P.2d 895 (1940) ;
Holtz v. Beal & Sons, Inc., 339 Mich. 235, 63 N.W.2d 627 (1954) ; Portsmith Transit
Co. v. Brickhouse, 200 Va. 844, 108 S.E.2d 385 (1959).
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-172 (1958) provides:
In actions by or against representatives of deceased persons, and by or against
the beneficiaries of any life or accident insurance policy insuring a person who
is deceased at the time of the trial, the entries, memoranda and declarations of
the deceased, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received as evidence. In
actions by or against the representatives of deceased persons, in which any trus-
tee or receiver is an adverse party, the testimony of the deceased, relevant to
the matter in issue, given at his examination, upon the application of such trustee
or receiver, shall be received in evidence.
Id.
39. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-173 (1958). See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1261,
Comment at 267 (West 1966).
40. 148 Conn. 510, 172 A.2d 621 (1961).
et al.: Rule 8-04(b)(2) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Step
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1070
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to the worn and slippery edges of a stairway. The plaintiff, executrix of
the decedent's estate, sued the owners of a two-family house, claiming
that the injury was caused by the defective condition of a common
stairway. Unavailability of the declarant, however, was not the deter-
mining factor of admissibility. The decedent's statement was necessary
to rebut the testimony given in court by the defendants.41
The mere unavailability of the declarant should not, therefore,
remove the declarant's hearsay statement from the operation of the
hearsay rule." Rule 8-04(a), as a general exception to the proposed
federal hearsay rule,4" specifies no further requirement of necessity than
the declarant's unavailability. 4 It follows, then, that rule 8-0 4 (a) would
not be sufficient as a hearsay exception without the added requirement
that the out-of-court statements have "strong assurances of accuracy.""1
Rule 8-04(b) (2), as an illustration of 8-04(a), must sanction only those
statements of an unavailable declarant, absent some further compelling
need, made under circumstances known to give strong assurances of
accuracy to the statements.4
THE ELEMENT OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
Courts will admit untested hearsay evidence where it is probable that
the statements are accurate and trustworthy.' Rule 8-04(a) calls for
"strong assurances of accuracy."4 8 The question then becomes whether
41. Id.
42. See notes 20-40 supra and accompanying text. Contra, In re Keenan, 287 Mass.
577, 192 N.E. 65 (1934). In a disbarment proceeding, the court admitted the statement
of a deceased juryman that he had taken a bribe from the lawyer in question. This ex-
ception to the hearsay rule was made pursuant to MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65 (1956).
In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased per-
son shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation
between husband and wife, as the case may be, if the court finds that it was made
in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.
Id. For further applications see Young v. Slaney, 255 F.2d 785 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Kelly
v. Jordan Marsh Co., 278 Mass. 101, 179 N.E. 299 (1939). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 9-19-11 (1956), and supporting cases, Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. United
States, 241 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I. 1965); Waldman v. Shipyard Marina, Inc., 230 A.2d
841 (R.I. 1967).
43. FED. R. EvID. 8-02, 46 F.R.D. 343 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
44. Compare UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(4) (c), Commissioners' Note:
The fact remains that there is a vital need for a provision such as this to prevent
miscarriage of justice resulting from the arbitrary exclusion of evidence which
is worthy of consideration, when it is the best available.
Id. (emphasis added).
45. FEn. R. EViD. 8-04(a), 46 F.R.D. 377 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
46. Cases cited note 13 supra.
47. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1422 (3d ed. 1940), quoted in Dallas County v. Com-
mercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; Olesen v. Henningsen, 247
Iowa 883, 77 N.W.2d 40 (1956) ; Fauceglia v. Harry, 409 Pa. 155, 185 A.2d 598 (1962).
48. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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rule 8-04(b) (2) is a proper illustration of rule 8-04(a) with regard to
admitting as evidence hearsay statements offering strong assurances of
accuracy. The naked thrust of the rule is to allow into evidence a
"statement . . . which narrates, describes, or explains an event or
condition recently perceived by the [now unavailable] declarant . . .. "
Wigmore states that there are three classes of reasons underlying the
exceptions to the hearsay rule.5" It is situations under these classifications
that the courts have sanctioned as sufficient guarantees of trustworthi-
ness:51
(1) Where the circumstances are such that a sincere and
accurate statement would naturally be uttered, and no plan of
falsification be formed; (2) where, even though a desire to
falsify might present itself, other considerations, such as the
danger of easy detection or the fear of punishment, would
probably counteract its force; (3) where the statement was
made under such conditions of publicity that an error, if it had
occurred, would probably have been detected and corrected.52
The Natural Utterance of an Accurate Statement
Prime examples of statements which involve circumstances under
which a sincere and accurate statement would naturally be uttered are
those that are a part of the res gestae. 5 In Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.
v. Mears,54 a severely injured railroad conductor was found lying beside
a track in a railroad yard. His statement that he had been knocked from
the train by a car on the adjacent track was admitted into evidence. The
court found a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness in his statement
because it had been made under the immediate influence of the accident.
49. FED. R. EViD. 8-04(b) (2), 46 F.R.D. 377 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
50. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1422 (3d ed. 1940).
51. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
52. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1422 at 205 (3d ed. 1940), quoted in Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 1961).
53. The court in General Schuyler Ins. Co. v. Shustick, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 205, 213,
40 N.E.2d 485, 489 (Ct. App. 1941) stated:
[Res gestae] may be broadly defined as meaning matter incidental to the main
fact and explanatory of it, including acts and words which are so closely con-
nected therewith as to constitute a part of the transaction, and without a knowl-
edge of which the main fact might properly be understood. * * * They are in-
cidents of the act, and not the act itself.
Four major exceptions have evolved from the concept of res gestae: 1) Declarations of
present bodily condition; 2) declarations of present mental state and emotion; 3) ex-
cited utterances; and 4) declarations of the present sense impression. Wabiskey v. D.C.
Transit Sys., 309 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
See FED. R. EVlD. 8-03(b) (1), (2) & (3), 46 F.R.D. 345 (Prelim. Draft 1969) for
these exceptions.
54. 64 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1933).
et al.: Rule 8-04(b)(2) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Step
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1070
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The court ruled:
[D]eclarations which are the natural emanation or outgrowths
of the act or occurrence of the litigation, although not precisely
concurrent in point of time, if they were yet voluntarily and
spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the
presence of the transaction . . . and were made under such
circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or
deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of justice, be
admissible as part of the act or transaction itself.5
It is doubtful whether narrations of past events are made "under such
circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation."
The mind of the declarant is no longer under the control of the event.
The courts, therefore, have adopted the presumption that his later
statements are deliberate."
The statement considered in Bennette v. Hader"' was made ap-
proximately one minute after the declarant, an accident victim, had
regained consciousness. He was still at the scene of the accident and was
suffering intense pain. The statement was admitted into evidence because it
apparently was the spontaneous result of the accident and
resulting death [of another passenger] upon the senses of the
speaker rather than the result of premeditation, design or rea-
soning from the facts."
The preclusion of the possibility of deliberation and fabrication results
55. Id. at 293. See the "Washington Rule" stated in Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 10,
92 P.2d 1113, 1117 (1939), quoted in Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Heatfield, 141 F.2d
648 (9th Cir. 1944):
(1) The statement or declaration must relate to the main event and must explain,
elucidate, or in some way characterize that event, (2) it must be a natural dec-
laration or statement growing out of the event, and not a mere narrative of a
past, completed affair, (3) it must be a statement of a fact, and not a mere
expression of an opinion, (4) it must be a spontaneous or instinctive utterance
of thought, dominated or evoked by the transaction or occurrence itself, and not
the product of premeditation, reflection, or design, (5) while the declaration or
statement need not be coincident or contemporaneous with the occurrence of the
event, it must be made at such a time and under such circumstances as will ex-
clude the presumption that it is the result of deliberation, and, (6) it must ap-
pear that the declaration or statement was made by one who either participated
in the transaction or witnessed the act or fact concerning which the declaration
or statement was made.
Id. at 651.
56. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Mears, 64 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1933). See also
Jack v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 113 F. 49 (5th Cir. 1902) ; Showalter v. Western
Pac. Ry. Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 460, 106 P.2d 895 (1940) ; Bennette v. Hader, 337 Mo. 977,
87 S.W.2d 413 (1935).
57. 337 Mo. 977, 87 S.W.2d 413 (1935).
58. Id. at 416.
334
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in a high degree of reliability and trustworthiness. 9 Here, from the
peculiar circumstances, the senses of the declarant were so controlled by
what had happened that his statement was the natural product of the
accident itself.60
A narrative of a past event is not a circumstance under which a
sincere and accurate statement would naturally be uttered."' A case which
clearly states this proposition is Portsmith Transit Co. v. Brickhouse 2
In that decision, a driver's statement to a police officer, made twenty
minutes after an accident, was determined inadmissible hearsay because
it was merely a narrative of a past event.63 In discussing the lack of
natural reliability surrounding the circumstances of the narrative account,
the court stated:
[T]he spontaneity of the utterance is the guarantee of its trust-
worthiness . . . it must be made at such a time and under such
circumstances as will preclude the presumption that it is the
result of deliberation. It must not be a narrative of a past,
completed affair. 4
A second example showing that a narrative is not a natural utterance
is United States v. Mountain State Fabricating Co."5 In that case, the
witness saw a fire and asked an unidentified workman what had happened.
The workman stated that he and another workman had noticed the fire
and had extinguished it. After returning from a lunch break, however, the
workmen again found the structure afire. In an ensuing negligence action,
the court held that even though the fire was still burning when the
account was purportedly given, the retrospective character of the state-
ment offered little assurance of reliability. Lack of spontaneity was held
to be the determining factor in the court's rejection of the statement.6 "
The workman had time to make a considered response, and his account
of the fire was not a natural emanation of the event itself.6
A narration, explanation or description of a past event, not spon-
59. Id. See also American Mfg. Co. v. Bigelow, 188 F. 34 (2d Cir. 1911); Glough
v. General Box Co., 302 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1957).
60. Bennette v. Hader, 337 Mo. 977, 87 S.W.2d 413 (1935).
61. "Natural" is defined as "truly representing or expressing one's nature, appear-
ance, sentiment, etc." WEBsma's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 560 (2d ed. 1955).
62. 200 Va. 844, 108 S.E.2d 385 (1959).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 387.
65. 282 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1960).
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Bonner v. Texas Co., 89 F2d 291 (5th Cir. 1937), where a work-
man, forty-five minutes after he was burned, calmly explained the circumstances of his
accident to his wife. He later died. The court held that his statements were unreliable
because they were a narrative of a past event and were fraught with deliberation.
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taneous to it, affords the declarant an opportunity to weigh the conse-
quences of his thoughts and ultimately add design to the statement he
makes. As a result, he may recount the event as he remembers it, rather
than as it happened, or he may even mold it to his own liking."8 Since a
narration of a past event is not what has been termed the statement or
gesture drawn out by the circumtances of the event, there 'should be no
presumption, based upon the aspect of spontaneity, that such a statement
is sincere and accurate."9
Fear of Punishment
The second circumstance determinative of an accepted degree of
trustworthiness permits a non-spontaneous statement where the danger of
easy detection or the fear of punishment would probably deter falsifica-
tion." Dying declarations, official statements and prior testimony under
oath are commonly made under such circumstances."1
The fear of divine punishment is believed to instill in a person who
knows he is dying a tendency to tell the truth. 2 Shortly before he died, a
victim of a shotgun blast told the investigating sheriff that his brother-in-
law had shot him. In the ensuing murder trial,7 the court acknowledged
the reliability of dying declarations made "in view of impending death and
judgment, when the last hope of life is extinct, and when the retributions
of eternity are at hand.""' Since the state, however, did not offer
evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the victim knew he
was dying when he made the statement, the court rejected the statement
as being no more reliable than ordinary hearsay. The court explained:
If the statements made by the deceased were not made with
knowledge of impending death and judgment, that his last hope
of life was gone, that his soul was soon to take its flight into
the unexplored realms of eternity "from whose bourne no
68. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961) ; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Heatfield, 141 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Bennette
v. Hader, 337 Mo. 977, 87 S.W.2d 413 (1935); General Schuyler Ins. Co. v. Shustick, 35
Ohio L. Abs. 205, 40 N.E.2d 485 (Ct. App. 1941).
69. United States v. Mountain State Fabricating Co., 282 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1960)
McKensie Transp. Leas. Co. v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 349 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. App.
1961) ; Portsmith Transit Co. v. Brickhouse, 200 Va. 844, 108 S.E.2d 385 (1959).
70. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961).
71. See State v. Caissie, 24 Conn. Supp. 360, 190 A.2d 604 (1963) (official state-
ment) ; Duke v. State, 205 Ga. 106, 52 S.E.2d 455 (1949) (dying declaration) ; In re
Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65 (1934) (juror's admission under oath) ; Fauceglia
v. Harry, 409 Pa. 155, 185 A.2d 598 (1962) (army medical records, official statements).
72. Duke v. State, 205 Ga. 106, 52 S.E.2d 455 (1949).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 457.
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traveler returns," the law would not impart that equal solem-
nity to his statements equivalent to testimony under oath.71
A narration of a past event, not in response to the instigation of a
person engaged in investigating, litigating or settling a claim, is a vol-
untary statement that is not made under fear of detection or punishment.
Though the motive to falsify may be lessened by barring statements
which are the fruits of investigatory procedures, fear of detection or
punishment is still not present in the making of statements which would
be admissible under rule 8-04(b) (2). Therefore, the rule does not prom-
ise or even render probable the particular assurances of accuracy
offered by these special circumstances.
Conditions of Publicity
The third circumstance lending reliability to a hearsay statement is
the condition of publicity under which it was made. Publicity is expected
to assure a probability of detection and correction when a statement is in
error."6 In Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,7 the court
admitted an article from a newspaper published fifty-eight years before
the trial. The court explained that although newspaper articles are not
usually admissible since they are hearsay, in this instance a small town
was involved, and the resulting conditions of publicity were such that a
false report of a fire in the town's courthouse tower would have sub-
jected the newspaper and the reporter to embarassment in the com-
munity. The court concluded:
To our minds the article published in the Selma Morning-
Times on the day of the fire is more reliable, more trustworthy,
more competent evidence than the testimony of a witness called
to the stand fifty-eight years later."8
In most cases, a general statement narrating a past event would not
be made under conditions of publicity."M Therefore, with regard to
conditions of publicity, statements excepted from the operation of the
hearsay rule by rule 8-04(b) (2) would not offer corresponding as-
surances of accuracy."
75. Id.
76. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.
1961).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 397.
79. For examples under the Federal Rules of Evidence which derive trustworthiness
from conditions of publicity, compare FED. R. EvID. 8-03(b) (16) and 8-03(b) (18), 46
F.R.D. 349 (Prelim. Draft 1969) with 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1522, 1632 (3d ed. 1940).
80. As to these three circumstances, Wigmore stated:
First, it is not always that an exception is founded merely on a single one of
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LIMITATIONS OF UNRELIABILITY
With little guarantee of reliability in narrations of past events, what
assurances of accuracy are gained by limiting the application of rule
8-04(b) (2) to statements made: 1) not in response to investigatory
functions; 2) ante litem motam; 3) recent to the event; 4) with clear
recollection; and 5) in good faith? First, the rule limits admissibility to
statements "not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim."'" This provision was
incorporated to exclude inherently unreliable statements "carefully pre-
pared under the tutelage of lawyers, claim adjusters, or investigators with
a view to pending or prospective litigation."8 With the exclusion
of such statements, the circumstantial probability of unreliability resulting
from investigatory procedures is avoided. This, however, does not result
in the conclusion that statements otherwise admissible under rule 8-04
(b) (2) would then be reliable.
Secondly, the rule prohibits statements made "in contemplation of
pending or anticipated litigation in which he [the declarant] was
interested." 8 The ante litem motam clause is usually present in excep-
tions whose reliability would otherwise be unquestioned except for the
possibility of some interest in litigation, present or future, to which the
declarant might pattern his statement.84 Although some specifically
unreliable statements are prohibited by this clause, there is still little
assurance that the permitted statements will be reliable.
Thirdly, rule 8-04(b) (2) limits admissibility to statements of events
these considerations. Often it rests on the operation, in different degrees, of two
of them. . . . Secondly, the exceptions have been established casually in the
light of practical experience, and with little or no effort (except in modern
times) at generalization or comprehensive planning. The courts have had in
mind merely to sanction certain situations as a sufficient guarantee of trust-
worthiness. Nevertheless, in analyzing the notions on which the exceptions
have proceeded, we may distinguish clearly the three separate types of reason
above set forth.
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1422 at 205 (3d ed. 1940). It is to be presumed that if a state-
ment is not made under any one of the three sets of circumstances indicative of sufficient
trustworthiness, then the statement cannot fit the circumstances of any combination of
the three. Therefore, it cannot of itself point to the degree of reliability the circumstances
contemplate.
81. FED. R. EvID. 8-04(b) (2), 46 F.R.D. 377 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
82. Id. Committee Note at 383. The lack of such a clause was one of the main
reasons for the deletion of rule 63(4) (c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence from the
California Evidence Code. See 4 CALIFORNIA LAw REVISION COMM'N, TENTATIVE REC-
OMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 318 (1962).
83. FED. R. EVID. 8-04(b) (2), 46 F.R.D. 377 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
84. Strickland v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 140 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1944) ; In re Bus-
teed's Estate, 105 Cal. App. 2d 14, 232 P.2d 881 (1951) ; Morgan v. Susino Constr. Co.,
130 N.J.L. 418, 33 A.2d 607 (1943).
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"recently perceived." 5 In general, a hearsay statement must be made
contemporaneous to the event about which it ,speaks. 6 The lapse of time,
however, between the event and the statement elucidating the event is
not indicative of reliability-it only helps to determine whether the
statement could have been spontaneous.8 " If there is a lack of spontaneity,
the lapse of time involved permits the moment of deliberation and the
opportunity to fabricate that courts have not permitted.8 Where the
declarant has the opportunity to falsify his account of the event perceived,
he must make his statement under circumstances that guarantee that he
will not falsify. It is submitted, however, that an 8-04(b) (2) statement
does not offer this guarantee. It would therefore seem that the exclusion of
statements narrating events not recently perceived by the declarant would
not assure that statements ultimately admitted would be accurate.8"
Fourthly, the rule bans statements made by the declarant when his
85. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1675 (unabr. 1961), de-
fines perception as:
[P]hysical sensation as interpreted in the light of experience; the integration of
sensory impressions of events in the external world by a conscious organism
esp. as a function of non-conscious expectations derived from past experience
and serving as a basis for or as verified by further meaningful motivated action.
Id. Rule 62(3) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence more simply provides: "Perceive
means acquire knowledge through one's own senses." Id.
86. Courts have found statements contemporaneous when they were uttered im-
mediately after the event perceived. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Mears, 64 F.2d
291 (4th Cir. 1933) (several minutes after an injury) ; Rice v. Jackson, 1 Mich. App. 105,
134 N.W.2d 366 (1965) (during a fire) ; Bennette v. Hader, 337 Mo. 977, 87 S.W.2d 413
(1935) (one minute after regaining consciousness). Contra State v. Simmons, 52 N.J.
538, 247 A.2d 313 (1968) (several hours after an assault) ; Ogden Iron Works v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942) (nine days after an accident).
87. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Heatfield, 141 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Bonner
v. Texas Co., 89 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Showalter v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 16 Cal.
App. 2d 460, 106 P.2d 895 (1940); McKensie Transport Leas. Co. v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., 349 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. App. 1961) ; Portsmith Transit Co. v. Brickhouse, 200
Va. 844, 108 S.E.2d 385 (1959).
88. The risk of untrustworthiness is found in the period of time between the event
and the statement describing the event that allows the declarant to deliberate. Showalter
v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 460, 106 P.2d 895 (1940) ("before time to re-
flect upon the consequences of his statement; . . . to negative any probability of fabri-
cating"); Hutcheis v. Cedar Rapids & M.C. Ry. Co., 128 Iowa 279, 103 N.W. 779 (1905)
("without opportunity for premeditation") ; Campbell v. Brown, 81 Kan. 480, 106 P. 37
(1910) ("where it appears that claimed exception to the hearsay rule was in fact a de-
liberate and considered answer"); Ammundson v. Tinholt, 228 Minn. 115, 36 N.W.2d
521 (1949) ("unless the party making it had the capacity of recollecting and narrating
the facts to which his utterance relates") ; Bennette v. Hader, 337 Mo. 977, 87 S.W.2d
413 (1935) ("to preclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication") ; Portsmith Transit
Co. v. Brickhouse, 200 Va. 844, 108 S.E.2d 385 (1959) ("to exclude the presumption
that it is the result of deliberation").
89. No consideration has been given to the dilemma of what is or is not recent
since recency cannot be shown to assure reliability, but only to obviate certain unreli-
ability. For a consideration of the problem of recency, see Gard, Evidence, 12 KAN. L.
REv. 239 (1963).
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recollection of the event or condition was unclear."0 What is or is not clear
recollection can only be determined in a courtroom by objective standards.
Either a witness must testify to what he believes was the probable
clearness of the declarant's recollection, or the court must look to the
circumstances under which the statement was made-recency of per-
ception, complexity of the event and the then-existing mental state of the
declarant. The problem, however, is who can testify to the declarant's
capacity for remembering. It is suggested that despite the most cautious
judicial discretion, the probability that only accurate statements will be
admitted regarding the clearness of recollection of a recently perceived
event will necessarily be low."'
Not only does our idea of the past become inexact by the
mere decay and disappearance of essential features; it becomes
positively incorrect through the gradual incorporation of ele-
ments that do not properly belong to it . . . extraneous ideas
become imported into our mental representation of a past event.9"
The declarant's subjective attentiveness is critical in determining
the quality of his perception and recollection.9 A clear recollection may
still be a "tainted" recollection.9" It is submitted that a requirement for
clarity of recollection fails in its objectivity to consider a subjective
question.
When the requirement of good faith is added to the foregoing
limitations, the basic exception is restored to its original context. It is
submitted that good faith, by itself, is impossible to discern, and that it
is actually the presence of bad faith that permits detection. A good faith
requirement can only assure detection of statements obviously untrust-
worthy because of their apparent bad faith origin.
90. FED. R. EvID. 8-04(b) (2), 46 F.R.D. 377 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
91. Though some of the "fact" variations in the testimony of those involved in
legal controversies are due to perjury, most of them are honest variations caused by the
inherent nature of man himself. "His thought processes do not always permit him to
record and relate accurately the true character of those images or stimuli which affect
his senses." W. Rokes, Memory Taints Witness Credibility, 5 TRIAL 46 (1969).
92. F. WELLMAN, TnE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 158 (4th ed. 1936).
93. W. Rokes, Memory Taints Witness Credibility, 5 TRIAL 46 (1969).
94. Through his reasoning processes, he [man] interprets a stimulus.
Thus, he sometimes modifies, or completely changes, what was originally per-
ceived. As a consequence, imperfections in human sensitivity, man's peculiar
mental processes, and dishonesty, result in wide distortions and differences in
perception, recollection, and narration. . . His recollection of an earlier event
may be so intermingled with the memory of subsequent events that a narration
of the earlier event will be distorted.
Id. at 46.
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THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
It was the hope of the draftsmen of the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence that the addition of the clause prohibiting admission of
statements obtained through the instigation of persons engaged in in-
vestigating, litigating or settling claims would cure one of the apparent
defects of rule 63(4) (c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.95 There is,
however, an added danger overlooked by the draftsmen with regard to
differences between the Uniform Rule and the Federal Rule. Rule
63(4) (c) was drafted to indicate an attitude of reluctance that requires
the most careful scrutiny before admitting hearsay evidence under its
provisions." Rule 8-04(b) (2) of the Federal Rules would be subject to
the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 43(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the admissibility of
evidence in federal courts" and requires that rules of evidence be con-
strued to favor admissibility.9 There is hesitation to accept the hearsay
statements of the type contemplated in the Uniform Rules, whereas there
is a tendency to favor the same statements under the Federal Rules
approach. There is, therefore, a significant difference in discretion
between the two rules regarding the admissibility of hearsay, and it is the
Federal Rule that permits the less discrete approach. It is submitted that
this can only decrease the probable accuracy of 8-04(b) (2) statements.
A LIBERALIZATION BEYOND REASON
Rule 8-04(b) (2) is not a good illustration of the admonition of rule
8-04(a) because the safeguards written into 8-04(b) (2) are not adequate
when applied to "offer strong assurances of accuracy." The safeguards
eliminate only those hearsay declarations which are assuredly inaccurate.
This internal inconsistency of the Federal Rules of Evidence is obvious if
it is assumed that the draftsmen equated "strong assurances of accuracy"
to the common law standard of strong probability of trustworthiness.'
The draftsmen, however, may have intended the federal standard to be a
relaxation of the common law standard. If this is the case, the rule is not
95. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
96. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(4) (c), Commissioners' Note.
97. FED. R. EVID. 8-02, 46 F.R.D. 343 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). See United States v. Castellana, 349 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966).
99. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Funel, 383 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1957).
100. FED. R. EvID. 8-04(b) (2), Committee Note, 46 F.R.D. 377, 383 (Prelim. Draft
1969). The draftsmen of the Federal Rules have elected against admitting all hearsay
or discarding all hearsay, but instead favor a qualified rule against hearsay, the excep-
tions to which offer reliability above the normal to be expected. FED. R. EvrD. art. VIII,
Introductory Note, 46 F.R.D. 324, 328 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
et al.: Rule 8-04(b)(2) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Step
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1070
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
clear. The Committee Note states that rule 8-04(a), which offers "strong
assurances of accuracy," is consistent with the pattern of hearsay excep-
tions at common law with respect to the declarations of unavailable
declarants.' A lower standard of reliability is applied to these declara-
tions. It is submitted, however, that the reliability inherent to narrations
of past events cannot be compared with the reliability of statements
peculiar, for example, to common law exceptions for ancient deed recitals,
family history, declarations against interest or dying declarations. The
latter statements are felt reliable because of the obvious lack of motive to
misrepresent or deceive, whereas narrations of past events are replete
with incentive to falsify. Where there is both motive and opportunity to
deceive, the standards of reliability of acceptable hearsay must be raised,
not lowered.
The final consideration is whether rule 8-04(b) (2), though a
weak attempt at liberalization, may still be beneficial to the adversary,
judicial determination of factual issues. It is submitted that the rule would
permit gross falsification of the most undetectable variety. Employable
safeguards regarding the witness' reproduction of the declarant's un-
reliable statements are virtually non-existent. The rule does not differenti-
ate between declarations offered by interested proponents and declarations
offered by disinterested proponents. This problem is particularly critical
since both written and oral declarations would be admissible. Oral
hearsay would certainly be more subject to false reproduction by the
proponent than written hearsay. It is submitted that cross-examination of
an interested proponent would not expose his falsification; nor could
cross-examination serve as a sufficient deterrent to falsification." 2 The
witness need only state what he remembers or "thinks" the declarant
said. The exposure of perjured testimony would be so remote in such an
instance that the probability of accuracy of an uncorroborated 8-04(b) (2)
statement would be indeterminable. This situation, if accepted, would
relegate the hearsay rule to one of preference. Without discussing the value
of a hearsay rule as a rule of preference rather than as a rule of exclusion,
it should be noted that the draftsmen of the Federal Rules intended the
federal hearsay rule to be a rule of exclusion.0 3
An 8-04(b) (2) declaration is not subject to cross-examination.
Therefore, information affecting the declarant's grounds of knowledge,
interest, bias, character and other supplementary and qualifying facts
101. FED. R. EvID. 8-04(a), Committee Note, 46 F.R.D. 377, 379 (Prelim. Draft
1969).
102. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954).
103. FED. R. EvID. art. VIII, Introductory Note, 46 F.R.D. 324, 327 (Prelim. Draft
1969).
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cannot be uncovered except through extraneous corroboration. The rule,
however, does not require corroboration as a condition of admissibility.
An 8-04(b)(2) statement would then be similar to most non-hearsay
statements given under direct examination-it could either be an incom-
plete statement or a misstatement. Evidence of this kind is not useful for
determining factual issues until it is subjected to cross-examination.'
Since the out-of-court declarant cannot be cross-examined, and since
cross-examination of the proponent of the declarant'is statement is not a
satisfactory substitute, his statement, to be suitable, must be made under
circumstances assuring reliability.' Without this assurance, hearsay is
not useful in determining factual issues and is detrimental to the adversary
judicial process of litigation. It is submitted that rule 8-04(b) (2) would
admit evidence that is not only useless, but also detrimental to evidentiary
determinations of fact.
CONCLUSION
Assurances of accuracy are not gained by merely avoiding the
potentially unreliable circumstances under which hearsay statements are
made. Rule 8-04(b) (2) offers the probability that only certain obviously
inaccurate statements of recently perceived events will be detected. This is
not an assurance of accuracy. Rule 8-04(a) calls for strong assurances of
accuracy that rule 8-04(b) (2) cannot meet. It is submitted, therefore,
that rule 8-04(b) (2) is not a proper illustration of rule 8-04 (a) and
should be deleted.
The risk of a blanket exception such as rule 8-04(b) (2) is not
necessary. Rule 8-04(a) provides a guideline for determining the admis-
sion of desirable hearsay statements in the future. In Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co.,' the court did not admit the fifty-
eight-year-old newspaper article because of any existing exception to the
hearsay rule, but because of the unavailability of its author and the
strong assurances of accuracy relating to the specific circumstances
surrounding its publication.' The court in United States v. 6o.14 Acres
of Land"'8 referred to evidence "admitted because it was necessary and
trustworthy, under a court-created exception to the hearsay rule .. ..",,9
It would be untenable to say that a declarant's unavailability should
itself determine the admissibility of a hearsay statement."0 A hearsay
104. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 19 (1954).
105. Id. at § 225.
106. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
107. Id.
108. 362 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1966).
109. Id. at 666.
110. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940).
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statement must first offer some extra assurance of accuracy, and then
"there is reason for admitting it as not merely the best that can be got
from that witness, but better than can ordinarily be expected without the
test of cross-examination." 11'
It is the "proper office of the expounder of law" to distinguish its
applications from rulings which are merely arbitrary." 2 While rule
8-04(a) may permit some welcome liberalization of the hearsay rule
when necessity dictates without sacrificing the requirement of reliability,
it is submitted that rule 8-04(b) (2) goes too far. With regard to the
hearsay problem, the court in United States v. Castellana,"8 stated:
We are loath to reduce the corpus of hearsay rules to a straight-
jacketing, hypertechnical body of semantical slogans to be
mechanically invoked regardless of the reliability of the prof-
fered statement. 
1 4
It is submitted that rule 8-04(b) (2) is to be the antithesis of the
exceptions contemplated in the Castellana decision. It is a loose body of
semantical slogans to be haphazardly invoked regardless of the un-
reliability of the proffered statement, and as such, should be rejected." 5
111. Id.
112. Id. at § 1423.
113. 349 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928 (1966).
114. Id. at 276.
115. This note is in response to Mr. Albert E. Jenner's request for criticisms of
the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. Committee Letter, 46 F.R.D. 173,
179 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
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